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David Lopes Gomes, Belo Horizonte / Brazil
* 
Luiz Philipe de Caux, Belo Horizonte / Brazil
** 
 
Constitution, Document of Culture and Barbarism
† 
 
Abstract: Based on Walter Benjamin’s reflections on history and social struggles, this paper drafts an 
analysis of the relations of the subject with some problems of constitutional theory, in a first effort to 
bring  the  field  nearer  to  social  philosophy.  After  tracing  a  short  narrative  on  modern 
constitutionalism and its new relationship with the historical time, we argument that Constitution shall 
be seen as a cultural document of memory of the social struggles of the past and at the same an object 
of the struggles of the present. Some inconclusive reflections on the possibility of human emancipation 
through law are presented as conclusion. 
Keywords: Modern Constitutionalism; History; Recognition; Walter Benjamin 
 
It is characteristic of the constitutional theory that it must always deal with the problems that 
emerge from the relationship between its object, the constitution, and its legitimacy through 
the historical time. From the old paradoxes that come along with the theme of constituent 
power until the problems of recent constitutional hermeneutics, constitutional theory seems to 
find history anywhere it turns its eyes to. Nevertheless, researchers of the discipline rarely 
devote special attention to this close relation, which remains almost unexplored.
1 
Modern constitutions are indeed historical documents, dated and signed. However, they 
do not immobilize a political community, freezing it in the very moment of its symbolic 
foundation. As a linguistic practice, a constitution must be always updated, and its meaning is 
subject to a struggle which is coextensive with the social struggle itself. We attempt to show 
here  that  an  appropriate  understanding  of  the  temporal  and  historical  aspects  of  the 
constitutions, which is fundamental also to think their legitimacy, must as well take seriously 
the dimension of the social conflict. If constitution has something to do with justice, or more 
particularly with a claim for justice and a denial of injustice, then it is to be thought not only 
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**  Undergraduate student at the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG), Brazil. 
†  We would like to thank specially to Vitor Blotta (USP-Brazil) for our kind discussion and his precious 
suggestions. To adopt them would require us to write a whole new paper, what would not be the case for this 
occasion. Further developments of the theme are sure going to take them into account. 
1 For a good overview on the relationship between constitution and historical time, see Stephan Kirste, 
Constituição como início do direito positivo: a estrutura temporal das constituições. Anuário dos Cursos de Pós-
Graduação em Direito, 13 , 2003, 1-30. See also Marcelo Andrade Cattoni de Oliveira, Democracia sem espera 
e processo de constitucionalização: uma crítica aos discursos oficiais sobre a chamada “transição política 
brasileira”,  Revista Anistia Política e Justiça de Transição, 3, 2010, 200-229. 2 
from the present on, but especially considering the injustices of the past, as a condition to 
every justice to come.
2 
We shall begin by a short narrative on modern constitutionalism and its new relation with 
tradition, history and time (I .); then, following the reflections of Walter Benjamin on the 
philosophy  of  history,  sketch  o ut  a  concept  of  constitution  as  normative  cultural 
tradition/transmission (Überlieferung) (II.); so we shall try to relate the struggle for cultural 
memory implicit on every interpretative update of the constitution with the moral grammar of 
recognition,  passing through one of the gaps  of Ricoeur's  Course of  Recognition (III.) to 
finally, in an inconclusive conclusion, make some appointments on the relationship between 
law and social struggles to further reflections (IV.). 
 
I. 
The rise of modern constitutionalism
3 takes place in a wider context of social changes that 
altogether correspond to the phenomenon known as Modernity. In the realms of law and 
politics Modernity would be characterized by modifications in the notions of political power 
and normative authority, as well as by modifications in the very relationship between the two 
spheres. 
For many centuries, the foundation of legitimacy to the exercise of political power and 
for legal norms rested on the triad composed by tradition, religion an d authority. That triad 
tied the present to an immemorial past from which came the legitimating force to law and 
politics. That roman amalgam had been preserved, notwithstanding the obvious differences 
and although under a Christian robe, when the Catholic  Church assumed the course of the 
secular matters. 
However, the different changes that occurred since at least late Middle Ages  – such as 
the resurgence of cities and trade, the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution, the Reformation 
and the building of national state – undermined one by one the elements of that triad. In late 
eighteenth  century  the  revolutionaries  of  France  and  of  the  Thirteen  Colonies  found  it 
weakened and in a process of progressive disintegration. 
                                                           
2 We're thinking social justice here not in terms of distribution of goods and with the help of a supra-historical 
original position, but in terms of historically given intersubjective relations of recognition. See particularly Axel 
Honneth, Das Gewebe der Gerechtigkeit. Über die Grenzen des zeitgenössischen Prozeduralismus, in: Das Ich 
im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie, 2010, 51-77. 
3 Since it is not the main goal here, this approach will not address the important details, contradictions and 
differences that have characterized the birth and development of the modern concept of constitution. For more 
detailed analysis see Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, 1965; Horst Dippel, História do Constitucionalismo 
Moderno: Novas Perspectivas, 2007; Maurizio Fioravanti, Constitución: De la antiguedad a nuestros dias, 2001; 
Maurizio Fioravanti, Los derechos fundamentales: Apuntes de Historia de las Constituciones, 2003; Cristiano 
Paixão and Renato Bigliazzi, História constitucional inglesa e norte-americana: do surgimento à estabilização 
da forma constitucional, 2008. 3 
Notwithstanding the distinctive paths and solutions found on one side and the other of 
North  Atlantic,
4  the fact is that from those confrontations would arise a new concept of 
constitution. With the origin of its core meaning in the discussions between American 
colonists and the English metropolis, this concept would remain being debated throughout the 
nineteenth century and reach the twentieth century
5. On one hand, this new concept responded 
to the difficulties brought up by the fragmentation of that legitimating amalgam. On the other 
hand,  it  founded  a  new  relationship  between  law  and  politics:  politics  should  provide 
legitimacy to the law, while law should provide the binding force of political decisions. 
At the heart of this new relationship between law and politics appeared the notion of 
constituent power. Differing itself from ancient and medieval constitutions, if it is possible to 
speak of their existence, modern constitutions would have their birth dated in history. Thus, it 
was not only between law and politics that a new relationship e merged: more than that, the 
concept of modern constitution established a new relationship of the constitution, and of the 
law as a whole, with the very historical time. 
It is impossible to put under just one name the constitutional experience of Antiquity and 
Middle Ages. While the ancients saw the constitution as a political ideal, the Middle Ages 
took it as a given legal system: not something to be sought, but rather preserved. To the 
ancients, it should legitimize the existence of strong public forces ac knowledged within 
society, while for the Middle Ages it had the fundamental role of restricting intrinsically those 
same forces. And if the ancients sought a constitution as a counterpoint to the crisis brought 
about  by  the  recrudescence  of  economy  and  tra de,  comprehending  it  as  a  factor  of 
(re)invigoration of political sphere and  civic virtue, in the Middle Ages  economic  and 
patrimonial relations were the point of support on which was sustained its given legal system. 
Briefly, in ancient times the constitu tion appears as a project of social and political 
discipline, practically devoid of a normative-legal sense, while in the Middle Ages, although 
maintaining a social and political feature, it emerges in its normative meaning as given legal 
system composed by the broad set of agreements and pacts within the very society and 
destined to maintain the established social structure. 
Despite these relevant differences both constitutional experiences were placed under the 
aegis of the mentioned triad, within which t he constitution appears as expressing a mixed 
character and with its legitimating foundation fixed in an immemorial past. The dissolution of 
that triad prevented the modern constitutions to seek a basis of legitimacy only in the past. 
                                                           
4 See Arendt (note 3) and Paixão and Bigliazzi (note 3). 
5 For example, Arthur Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink, Weimar: A jurisprudence of Crisis, 2000. 4 
Instead, written with a certain fixed date at the present, modern constitutions would find their 
basis in their openness to the future.
6 
However, this would not mean a simple abandonment of the past. The new relationship 
between time and constitution, between historical time a nd law, would not be just a jump 
without  origin  toward the future.  If the past  could  no  more  be  the main  reference  of 
legitimating force, it continued to be the field of experiences from which it was possible to 
extract the reconstructive substrate for the   formulation of constitutions. The relationship 
between time and law became a complex relationship among past, present and future. 
Yet, as a result of a constituent power whose acts are fixed in a certain date, the opening 
to the future of those constitutions has always been problematic: how could those men who 
had written the constitutional text claim that this text binds also the following generations? 
This issue, which afflicted so much Jefferson in the context of the American Revolution
7, 
would not abandon constitutional theory through the last two centuries. 
The understanding of the constitution and of the constitutional identity
8  as an open 
project would enable important reflections on that point. Moreover, the contribution of 
hermeneutics would also be important: among other things, the distinction between text and 
norm and the conception of law as linguistic and interpretative practice would be fundamental 
points of that notion of open project. 
This attempt would after all be unproductive if it were not complemented by an analysis 
of how this open project is appropriated by different social actors in different contexts. Since 
modern constitutions have as their main purpose to organize and limit the actions of the state 
and its relationship with citizens as well as the relationship among the citizens themselves by 
means of a list of fundamental rights, it is precisely in this field, the field of fundamental 
rights, that this appropriation can show itself more clearly. 
 
II. 
Walter  Benjamin  understood  those  social  changes  that  characterized  Modernity  in  a  very 
particular way. It is true that he sounds often melancholic and nostalgic about that process that 
he called the loss of experience (Erfahrungsverlust), which accompanies the disenchantment 
of the world – to use Weber's expression – that mark the transition to Modernity. To him it is 
                                                           
6 One of the central features of modern constitution is its comprehension as a norm above the other norms, as a 
supra-legal norm. However, given the goals of this text, this feature will not receive a more detailed treatment. 
See: Paixão and Bigliazzi (note 3). 
7 Arendt (note 3), chapter 6. 
8 The main reference here is Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject, Cardozo Law Review 
16 (3-4), Jan. 1995, 1049-1109. 5 
clear, however, that Modernity brings, as the other side of the same coin, the conditions for 
the emancipation of the humanity. 
The preoccupation with the possibility of an authentic experience, not reducible to the 
instrumental  relation  between  a  subject  and  a  detached  object,  crosses  Benjamin's  whole 
work, from the early writing On the program of the coming philosophy
9 to the thesis On the 
concept of history.
10 Benjamin holds that with Modernity the possibility of such experiences, 
when our instrumental attention withdraws and gives way to a richer perception of the world, 
was almost eliminated. The advent of the line production now requires maximum attention of 
the worker, who could before distract and forget himself, as emerging in what he produces. 
The oral circulation of narratives, previously responsible for social integration, gives place to 
the unilateral form of the mass media, which requires also an ever lasting attention to every 
kind of useless information. Lastly, the so called decay of aura of the work of art: with the 
dissolution of the collective ritualistic distance in face of the work of art, disappears also the 
medium in whose horizon the individual biographies could relate themselves collectively with 
the history/memory of the whole community.
11 Benjamin sees in these structural changes the 
substitution of a richer model of experience (Erfahrung) by an impoverished one (Erlebnis), 
in  which  the  events  and  incidents  are  recorded  only  for  their  instrumental  value  of 
information. 
This new model of experience of the present leads also to another way of experiencing 
the  past.  The  qualitatively  dense  and  collectively  ensured  remembrance  (Erinnerung)  is 
replaced by a memory (Gedächtnis) supposed to be under control of the intelligence. 
As said before, in spite of this apparent nostalgic diagnostic, Benjamin doesn't aim at a 
re-enchantment  of  the  world,  a  return  to  the  pre-modern  condition.  Rather,  as  shows  for 
example his essay on the technical reproducibility of the work of art
12, his analysis 
 
holds on to the social, cultural and artistic processes of increasing fragmentation and triumphant 
secularization, not to try to take from there an irreversible tendency, but possible instruments 
                                                           
9 Walter Benjamin, Über das Programm der kommenden Philosophie, in: Gesammelte Schriften II-2, 1977, 157-
171. 
10 Walter Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte, in: Gesammelte Schriften I-2, 1974, 691-704. 
11 An illuminating summary to Benjamin's theme of the loss of experience is given by Axel Honneth, 
Kommunikative Erschließung der Vergangenheit. Zum Zusammenhang von Anthropologie und 
Geschichtsphilosophie bei Walter Benjamin, in: Die zerrissene Welt des Sozialen: sozialphilosophische Aufsätze, 
1999, point III, 101-104. Among Benjamin's texts, key ones are Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire. Ein 
Lyriker im Zeitalter des Hochkapitalismus, in: Gesammelte Schriften I-2, 1974, 509-690; Walter Benjamin, 
Erfahrung und Armut, in: Gesammelte Schriften II-1, 1977, 213-219; Walter Benjamin, Der Erzähler: 
Betrachtung zum Werk Nikolai Lesskows, in: Gesammelte Schriften II-2, 1977, 438-465. 
12 Walter Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit, in: Gesammelte 
Schriften I-2, 1974, 431-508. 6 
that a true “materialistic” policy should be able to recognize and make use in favor of the 
masses of excluded from culture, instead of letting the ruling class take possession of them and 
make of them new means of domination.
13 
 
Benjamin's critics on the modern consciousness of time and the way it deals with history and 
memory can be prolific too to think modern constitutions, since it's possible to think modern 
constitutions in the conceptual horizon of Modernity. 
The  reference  to  the  concept  of  Modernity  in  a  historical  context  appears  first  with 
Hegel, qualifying “his” age (in any case, the age of the present, the current age) as a new age, 
in opposition and rupture with the old past times.
14 What characterizes that new age is exactly 
its openness to future, its necessity to break at every moment with the past in o rder to affirm 
his present as the peak of the historical process. In Koselleck's classic formulation, in the 
modern times the horizon of expectation expands while it is more and more separated from 
the space of experience, which, in turn, shrinks.
15 Therefore, in Habermas words, “Modernity 
can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models 
provided by another epoch; it must create its normativity out of itself. Modernity sees itself, 
without possibility of escape, referred to itself.”
16 
In the thesis, Benjamin addresses heavy critics to this hegemonic consciousness of time, 
especially in the figures of the historicism and the social-democratic historiography in vogue 
in his time. In these representations of history, which claims to be able to know scientifically 
the whole of history (historicism) and sees in it the glorious and uninterrupted progress of 
humanity (social-democracy), Benjamin sees nothing but the narrative of the ruling classes. 
His counter proposition of writing history (and also of understanding it) is highly subversive. 
Once again following Habermas, “Benjamin turns back the sign of the radical orientation 
towards future that characterize in general Modernity to such a extent that it is transformed in 
a even more radical  orientation towards past”.
17 As if inverting the analysis of Koselleck 
                                                           
13 “Ela se atém aos processos sociais, culturais e artísticos de fragmentação crescente e de secularização 
triunfante, não para tentar tirar dali uma tendência irreversível, mas sim possíveis instrumentos que uma 
política verdadeiramente "materialista" deveria poder reconhecer e aproveitar em favor da maioria dos 
excluídos da cultura, em vez de deixar a classe dominante se apoderar deles e fazer deles novos meios de 
dominação”. Jeanne-Marie Gagnebin, História e narração em Walter Benjamin, 1999, 56. 
14 Jürgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne: Zwölf Vorlesungen, 1985, 13. 
15 Reinhart Koselleck, 'Erfahrunsraum' und 'Erwartungshorizont' – zwei historische Kategorien, in: Vergangene 
Zukunft: zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten, 1979, 359. 
16 “die Moderne kann und will ihre orientierenden Maßstäbe nicht mehr Vorbildern einer anderen Epoche 
entlehnen, sie muß ihre Normativität aus sich selber schöpfen. Die Moderne sieht sich, ohne Möglichkeit der 
Ausflucht, an sich selbst verwiesen”. Habermas (note 14), 16. Author's emphasis. 
17 “Benjamin dreht vielmehr die radikale, für die Neuzeit überhaupt charakteristische Zukunftsorientierung um 
die Achse der »Jetztzeit« so weit zurück, daß sie in eine noch radikalere Vergangenheitsorientirung überführt 
wird”. Habermas (note 14), 21. 7 
Benjamin acknowledges in the past a persistent horizon of not satisfied expectations which 
can only be pacified through a reconciling remembrance that does justice to it. 
As cultural documents, the constitutions are subject to the intergenerational transmission 
process  characterized  by  Benjamin  in  the  thesis  and  other  texts,  a  “concrete,  material 
historical process of relinquishment, perseverance, struggle and violence, that carries or not, 
leads or not, transmits or not an event or a work of the past to our present”.
18 In Benjamins 
words: 
 
Those that until today obtained victory, march together in the triumphal procession that leads the 
rulers of today over those that lie on the ground. The spoils are, as it uses to be, carried along 
with the  triumphal  procession.  They  call  it cultural  goods.  They  will  have to  reckon, in  the 
historical materialism, with a distanced observer, because what he sees as cultural goods attests, 
with no exception, a provenance he can't contemplate whitout horror. It owes its existence not 
only to the effort of the great geniuses who created it, but also to the nameless drudgery of its 
contemporaries. There is never a document of culture which is not, at the same time, a document 
of barbarism. And just as it is not free of barbarism, so does not the process of its transmission, 
in which it passes from a victor to another. 
19 
 
However, to understand this very often quoted and very often misunderstood passage of the 
seventh thesis, one needs to notice the specific sense that Benjamin gives to the expression 
cultural goods, which should not be mistaken for the general concept of culture.
20 In his essay 
about Eduard Fuchs, where he first develops his reflections on the matter, Benjamin alerts that 
historical materialism should not conceive by culture its disintegration into “goods which 
become objects of possession for mankind”.
21 Culture appears here “in a reified form”.
22 
                                                           
18 “processo histórico concreto, material, de desistências, de perseverança, de lutas e de violência, que 
transporta ou não, leva ou não, transmite ou não um acontecimento ou uma obra do passado até nosso 
presente” Jeanne Marie Gagnebin, Documentos de cultura / documentos de barbárie, Ide: Psicanálise e Cultura, 
31 (46), 2008, 81. 
19 "Wer immer bis zu diesem Tage den Sieg davontrug, der marschiert mit in dem Triumphzug, der die heute 
Herrschenden über die dahinführt, die heute am Boden liegen. Die Beute wird, wie das immer so üblich war, im 
Triumphzug mitgeführt. Man bezeichnet sie als die Kulturgüter. Sie werden im historischen materialisten mit 
einem distanzierten Betrachter zu rechnen haben. Denn was er an Kulturgütern überblickt, das ist ihm samt und 
sonders von einer Abkunft, die er nicht ohne Grauen bedenken kann. Es dankt sein Dasein nicht nur der Mühe 
der großen Genien, die es geschaffen haben, sondern auch der namenlosen Fron ihrer Zeitgenossen. Es ist 
niemals ein Dokument der Kultur, ohne zugleich ein solches der Barbarei zu sein. Und wie es selbst nicht frei ist 
von Barbarei, so ist es auch der Prozeß der Überlieferung nicht, in der es von dem einen an den andern gefallen 
ist". Benjamin (note 10), 696. 
20 This important distinction is owed to Jeanne-Marie Gagnebin (note 18). 
21 "Güter, die der Menschheit ein Objekt des Besitzes würden"  Walter Benjamin, Eduard Fuchs: der Sammler un 
der Historiker, in: Gesammelte Schriften II-2, 1977, 477. 
22 "Sie erscheint verdinglicht". Benjamin (note 21), 477. 8 
Benjamin  doesn't  refer,  thus,  to  culture  in  general  when  he  points  out  its  immanent 
barbarism. He refers to its illegitimate use, when its treated as something done that, like an 
inheritance, is took in possession by its legitimate descendants, those who will carry on the 
domination. 
There  is,  however,  another  way  in  which  cultural  transmission  occurs,  described  by 
Benjamin in the fourth thesis: 
 
The class struggle, which a historian schooled by Marx can never lose sight of, is a struggle for 
the rough and material things, without which there’s nothing fine and spiritual. Nevertheless, 
these spiritual things can’t be represented in the class struggle as the spoil of the victor. They are 
alive in that struggle as confidence, courage, humour, cunning and firmness, and they act from 
the depth of time. They will always question each victory of the rulers.
23 
 
Culture appears here precisely as the medium in which the claims of the past are manifested, 
their claims for recognition, as we will argue in the sequence. 
Understanding  the  process  of  constitutionalization  inside  the  broader  process  of  the 
cultural transmission, it’s even possible to sketch a benjaminian critic of constitution, from 
the distinction between the sphere of culture and its disintegration into cultural goods. This 
distinction defines also two distinct ways by which men can face up a constituent project. 
In the first of them the written text of the constitution is seen as a cultural good of their 
possession. That’s the way, for example, the Brazilian Supreme Court relates sometimes to 
the constitution: as something of her own, as its only and real legitimate guardian. 
In the second way constitution is understood as the living persistence in present of an 
unfinished past, full of promises and claims. It’s one of those fine and spiritual things which 
Benjamin talks about in the fourth thesis. Facing the constitution this way, social movements 
like Brazil’s MST (Movimento dos Sem Terra - Landless Rural Workers’ Movement) appeal 
to the very law to contest an oppressive traditional order. 
 
   
                                                           
23 “Der Klassenkampf, der einem Historiker, der an Marx geschlt ist, immer vor Augen steht, ist ein Kampt um 
die rohen und materiellen Dinge, ohne die es keine feinen und spirituellen gobt. Trotzdem sind diese letztern im 
Klassenkampf anders zugegen denn als die Vorstellung einer Beute, die an den Sieger fällt. Sie sind als 
Zuversicht, als Mut, als Humor, als List, als Unentwegtheit in diesem Kampf lebendig un sie wirken in die Ferne 
der Zeit zurück. Sie werden immer von neuem jeden Sieg, der den Herrschenden jemals zugefallen ist, in Frage 
stellen”. Benjamin (note 10), 694. 9 
III. 
In  his  Course  of  Recognition
  24,  Paul  Ricoeur  intends  to  highlight  the  ruled  polysemy, 
between the homonymy and univocity, of the term recognition in its everyday use and in 
modern philosophy. Scrutinizing two great French dictionaries – one from the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the other from the end of the twentieth century – Ricoeur distinguishes 
three focus of meaning, which he assimilates to three not chronologically linear philosophical 
moments that at first appear to have no reference to each other except the fact they come 
together in French under one phylosofema (reconnaissance): the Kantian Rekognition, the 
reconnaissance of Bergson and the Hegelian Anerkennung, indicating respectively the idea of 
recognition as identification, as self recognition and as mutual recognition. 
If, as Ricoeur argues, there is a ruled polysemy among the broad spectrum of meanings 
of the term recognition, then it should be possible, if not necessarily to fulfill the gaps of 
silence between one and other sense, at least to build bridges that enable to overcome those 
gaps safely. 
It doesn't seem so hard to construct such a bridge linking the reconnaissance of Bergson, 
related to  the sphere of memory, to  the Hegelian  Anerkennung, a  concept  of particularly 
ethical meaning, renewed and developed by a leading name of Critical Theory nowadays, 
Axel Honneth.
25 Thus, more than to partially corroborate the hypothesis of Ricoeur, it will be 
possible  to  launch  the  first  foundations  to  think  recognition  in  reference  to  what  the 
constitutionalist Stephan Kirste called the temporal structure of constitutions.
26 
As Ricoeur shows, in the two central chapters of Matter and Memory
27, Bergson, in order 
to provide an answer to the old philosophical problem of the union between soul and body, 
scrutinizes the relationship between the survival of images in memory and its recognition, this 
“concrete act by which we recover the past in the present".
28 
How can an image that comes to mind at the present moment be recognized as an image 
experienced in other times? To Bergson, it is the act of recognition, usually not conscious or 
                                                           
24 Paul Ricoeur, Percurso do reconhecimento, 2006. 
25 For it escapes the intentions of this text, we will not deal with the Rekognition, the third synthesis operated by 
consciousness, responsible to establishing the unity of experience, in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 
Approaches to this cognitive meaning of the term are already been done by contemporary theory of recognition, 
with important profit to his development. See the essays compiled in Axel Honneth, Unsichtbarkeit: Stationen 
einer Theorie der Intersubjektivität, 2003;  and the small but brilliant study Axel Honneth, Verdinglichung: eine 
anerkennungstheoretische Studie, 2005. 
26 Kirste (note 1). 
27 Chapters II e III, respectively “Of the recognition of images: memory and the brain” and “On the survival of 
images: memory and mind”. Henri Bergson, Matéria e memória: Ensaio sobre a relação do corpo com o 
espírito, 1999, 83-208. 
28 "...ato concreto pelo qual reavemos o passado no presente". Bergson (note 27), 99. 10 
voluntary
29, that allows the very distinction between past and present. But if it is possible to 
recognize, in the present, a past’s image, it is necessary to conclude, on the one hand, that the 
images of the past somehow survive in the present, they are preserved in a latent form; on the 
other hand, the past does not become past after having been present, but "it is 'contemporary' 
of the present that it was."
30 
This  Bergsonian  conception  of  time  strongly  influenced  Benjamin.
31  It  is  not  the 
"homogeneous, empty time"
32, designed “as if a waited or foreseen event, in any case waited 
from far away in the future, comes gradually near to present and then, once lived and flowed 
into present, falls in past in order to settle there as a remembrance”.
33 Paradoxically, just as 
the past is contemporary to the present, the present is not always contemporary to himself. To 
Benjamin, on the trail of Bergson and psychoanalysis,
34 all of the lived past remains virtually 
in each present moment and may emerge as a reminiscence that "flashes in a moment of 
danger."
35 
However, if the past is preserved in the present, it does not mean that it is accessible at 
any time, as if to know it would be necessary just an act of will combined with a research 
effort. This is the fundamental disagreement of Benjamin with the historicism in vogue at the 
time of the writing of thesis. For, if on one hand the past is preserved in latency, on the other, 
"it is an unrestorable image of the past that threatens to disappear with every present that does 
not recognize itself as aimed in that image".
36 
It is already possible to see in which way, in Benjamin, the recognition of the images of 
the past described by  Bergson takes a normative shape, indicating a coming nearer to 
recognition-Anerkennung.  It  is  clear  that  the  recognition  to  what  Benjamin  refers  is  not 
merely a cognitive act. History is not a scientific (instrumental) knowledge of the past. The 
historical truth is possible only when it is recognized in a certain present – not only in the 
sense of known again, identified, but at the same time in the ethical sense of being recognized 
                                                           
29 “We usually exercise our recognition before we can think it” (“Exercemos em geral nosso reconhecimento 
antes de pensá-lo”. Bergson (note 27), 106 
30 “... é 'contemporâneo' do presente que ele foi”. Ricoeur (note 24), 138. 
31 “We owe thus to Bergson, and so does Benjamin, accordingly his own confession, the comprehension of the 
essence of time” (“C’est donc bien à Bergson que nous devons, que Benjamin doit, selon ses propres aveux, de 
comprendre l’essence du temps”). Françoise Proust, L’histoire à contretemps: Le temps historique chez Walter 
Benjamin, 1994, 37).  
32 "die homogene und leere Zeit". Benjamin (note 10), 701. 
33 “comme si um évenement attendu ou prévu, em tout cas, attendu de loin dans l’avenir, se rapprochait 
progressivement du présent, puis, une fois vécu et déchargé dans le présent, tombait dans le passé pour s’y 
installer à titre de souvenir”. Proust, (note 31), 36. 
34 To an approach on Benjamin's though and freudian psychoanalysis, see Sérgio Paulo Rouanet, Édipo e o anjo: 
itinerários freudianos em Walter Benjamin, 1981. 
35 “im Augenblick einer Gefahr aufblitzt”. Benjamin (note 10), 695. 
36 “es ist ein unwiederbringliches Bild der Vergangenheit, das mit jeder Gegenwart zu verschwinden droht, die 
sich nicht als ihm gemeint erkannte". Benjamin (note 10), 695. 11 
in its own dignity. The present not just recognizes the past, but it recognizes itself in the past 
when it feels that it is aimed by the past. "The true picture of the past runs out, fast. The past 
only lets  to  be fixed, as  an image that  flashes irreversibly,  at  the moment  in  which it is 
recognized”.
37 
In  his  reading  of  Benjamin’s  work,  Honneth  tries  to  show  exactly  what  the  weak 
messianic power that past bequeaths to present as its claim must be understood in a post-
religious sense: “here the idea of a subsequent payment of a debt we have towards the victims 
of  the  crimes  of  the  past  must  admit  the  nature  of  a  symbolic  restitution  of  their  moral 
integrity”.
38 Thus, Benjamin's proposal of writing history in the thesis can be understood as a 
way of presenting to the "nameless drudgery"
39 of the losers of history the due recognition 
they did not have in life, saving them from a second and final death – the complete erasure of 
the traces of their passage through Earth, which is the menace addressed to them by the 
writing of history of the victors: “the dead are not safe if the enemy wins”.
40 The claim 
(Anspruch) that the past directs to the present is precisely the claim for the recognition that 
was denied in its time. 
Only  by  doing  justice  to  the  past  it  will  be  possible  to  interrupt  the  recurrence  of 
catastrophes that characterizes history. This is what Benjamin means with "to explode the 
continuum of history"
41, a task he attributes to the materialist historian. The po ssibility of all 
justice to come depends on that justice is done to the past. In other words: struggles for 
recognition can always be understood as struggles for the recognition of a memory and thus 
they are in a relationship of mutual dependence with the  very memory of the struggles for 
recognition. 
 
IV. 
Any connection drawn between Benjamin and law needs to refer to the enigmatic Zur Kritik 
der  Gewalt.  In that  text  Benjamin presents  a radical  critique of law. Prior to  Benjamin's 
contact with Marxism, the language in which that critique appears is not similar to that which 
characterizes  the  orthodox  Marxist  thought.  Nevertheless,  the  coincidence  is  in  the  total 
condemnation of the law, in the condemnation of the law as a whole. 
                                                           
37 "Das wahre Bild der Vergangenheit huscht vorbei. Nur als Bild, das auf Nimmerwiedersehen im Augenblick 
seiner Erkennbarkeit eben aufblitz, ist die Vergangenheit festzuhalten". Benjamin (note 10), 695. Our emphasis. 
38  “hier muss die Idee der nachträglichen Begleichung einer Schuld, die wir gegenüber den Opfern vergangener 
Verbrechen haben, den Charakter einer symbolischen Restitution ihrer moralischer Integrität annehmen”. 
Honneth (note 11), 109.  
39 "namenlosen Fron". Benjamin (note 10), 696. 
40 "auch die Toten werden vor dem Feind, wenn er siegt, nicht sicher sein". Benjamin (note 10), 695. 
41 “das Kontinuum der Geschichte aufzusprengen". Benjamin (note 10), 702. 12 
Although it is possible to verify positions and trends in a contrary direction, the overview 
of critical thinking about law tends to be quite negative. Law – with its rules, its concepts, its 
institutes and its rituals – is understood as a mere instrument of domination, as a limit, an 
obstacle to social change. 
The purpose of this article came from a different premise: law can be understood also in 
another perspective. It can be taken at the same time as limit and condition of possibility of 
social transformation. It is the basic premise that remains as the backdrop of the reflections on 
the relationship between memory, history, social struggle, recognition and constitution. 
Understood in the second way discussed above – that is, as the persistence in the living 
present  of  an  unfinished  past,  full  of  promises  and  claims  –  modern  constitutions  open 
themselves onto a complex temporal relationship which propitiates the articulation between 
past injustices and demands for justice to come. 
In this  sense they appear not  as  a restriction  to  social change, not  as an obstacle to 
emancipation, but as the very condition to these transformations. 
Many questions, however, arise at this point. Is it even possible to understand law as an 
instrument not only of domination but at the same time as an instrument of struggle against 
this domination? Or this way of understanding law is only an ideological way to prevent 
social struggles from reaching their full emancipatory potential? Social changes propitiated by 
law  would  always  be  mere  reforms?  The  revolution,  as  the  need  for  radical  social 
transformation, would always be incompatible with law? What are the limits of making law a 
condition of possibility to emancipation? Would the law be apt to deal with all kinds of 
demands for justice? Or its own formal structure would appear, always and in any case, as 
insuperable limit to some demands for justice and therefore to justice as a whole? 
Undoubtedly,  there  are  many  points  to  be  discussed  in  pursuit  of  an  adequate 
understanding of the relationship between law and social struggles. While to all these points it 
is possible to find answers already produced in other moments of history, they do not cease to 
ask new reflections from different points of view. The aim of this paper was to approach a 
small,  although  important  aspect  of  this  relationship,  hoping  to  contribute  to  further 
discussions on the topic. 
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